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ABSTRACT
This is an essay about the unwarranted erosion of two basic bankruptcy
principles: the cleavage effect of a debtor’s filing of a bankruptcy petition and
the equality of treatment of prepetition unsecured claims. These are two of the
most fundamental bankruptcy concepts. First courts and then Congress have
fashioned rules favoring the prepetition unsecured claims of vendors and
lessors that are inconsistent with these concepts. We explore the origins of
such favored treatment, question the commonly offered policy justifications,
and argue that the prepetition unsecured claims of vendors and lessors
generally should be afforded the same treatment in bankruptcy as other
prepetition unsecured claims.
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INTRODUCTION
There was testimony in the litigation that gave rise to Stern v. Marshall,1
the most cited Supreme Court decision relating to bankruptcy in the twentyfirst century, that Anna Nicole Smith’s stepson’s2 lawyer referred to Ms. Smith
as “Miss Cleavage.”3 Cleavage is just as important to those who pursue
bankruptcy as to those who pursued Ms. Smith.4
All bankruptcy cases start with the filing of a bankruptcy petition,5
regardless of whether the bankruptcy is the chapter 7 liquidation of the limited
assets of Casey Ariail or the chapter 11 restructuring of the debts of Double
Dave’s Pizzaworks, Inc.6 (“Double Dave”) or a chapter 9, 12, or 13 case.7 The
filing of that bankruptcy petition effects a cleavage, separating the debts
incurred before the filing of the petition from debts incurred after the filing of
the petition.8
As Professor Laura Bartell has observed, “The Bankruptcy Code . . .
divides the universe of claims into two basic categories—those that arise at or
before the order for relief concerning the debtor, and those that do not—and

1

131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
Understandably, J. Howard Marshall, III, did not refer to himself as Ms. Smith’s stepson. Less
understandable is why the Supreme Court referred to Ms. Smith, whose birth name was Vickie Lynn Hogan,
as simply “Vickie.” We do not regularly read Supreme Court decisions, but we cannot recall the Court’s
referring to Marbury as “William,” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), or, more recently, the
Court’s referring to Jeffrey Chafin as “Jeffrey” or Lynne Chafin as “Lynne” in Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct.
1017 (2013).
3 Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 275 B.R. 5, 32 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2002).
4 Cf. Stalnaker v. DLC, Ltd. (In re DLC, Ltd.), 295 B.R. 593, 605 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2003) (“The date of
the filing of the petition is important because it generally fixes the rights of the estate and other parties in
interest. Congress and courts commonly refer to the date of the bankruptcy petition as the ‘date of cleavage.’”).
The authors have used the introductory signal “cf” because the Bankruptcy Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit does not expressly compare Ms. Smith and bankruptcy.
5 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 302(a), 303(b) (2012); Berge v. Sweet (In re Berge), 37 B.R. 705, 706 (Bankr. W.D.
Wis. 1983) (“A bankruptcy ‘case’ commences with the filing of a petition . . . and may include a number of
adversary proceedings . . . and ‘contested matters’ . . . .”).
6 See DOUBLE DAVE’S PIZZAWORKS, http://www.doubledaves.com/ourstory (last visited Aug. 16, 2014).
All characters and events in this essay—even those based on real people—are entirely fictional.
7 See generally 1 DAVID G. EPSTEIN, STEVE H. NICKLES & JAMES J. WHITE, BANKRUPTCY 18–38 (1992)
(explaining the commencement of cases under the various chapters of the Code).
8 E.g., Everett v. Judson, 228 U.S. 474, 479 (1913) (“We think that the purpose of the [bankruptcy] law
was to fix the line of cleavage with reference to the condition of the bankrupt estate as of the time at which the
petition was filed . . . .”); Hollytex Carpet Mills v. Tedford, 691 F.2d 392, 393 (8th Cir. 1982 ) (“Historically,
the date of the filing on the petition in bankruptcy has been the cleavage date in defining rights of the debtor
and his creditors.” (quoting In re Statmore, 22 B.R. 37, 37–38 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1982))).
2
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treats each class very differently.”9 The following examples of the effect of
filing a chapter 7 petition and a chapter 11 petition support Professor Bartell’s
observation of the cleavage resulting from a bankruptcy petition.
As an example of the cleavage effect of a bankruptcy petition in chapter 7,
if Casey’s chapter 7 petition was filed on January 15, and he receives a
discharge on April 5, only creditors holding claims incurred before January 15
would share in any potential bankruptcy distribution or be affected by that
bankruptcy discharge. Casey would have no further personal liability for his
January 14 credit card charges and other prepetition debts, but he would
remain personally liable for his January 16 credit card charges and other
postpetition debts.10
The date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition also serves as the date of
cleavage in a chapter 11 case. If Double Dave’s chapter 11 petition was filed
on July 13, 2014, and its chapter 11 plan was confirmed on February 18, 2015,
Double Dave could not, in the interim between July 13, 2014, and February 18,
2015, make a payment on any debts incurred prior to July 13, 2014.11 And
Double Dave’s chapter 11 plan could be confirmed even though the payments
to creditors holding prepetition claims were nominal or even non-existent.12
In chapter 11 cases, as in chapter 7 cases,13 postpetition claims are treated
differently from prepetition claims.14 Double Dave could, at any time prior to
plan confirmation, pay debts incurred after it filed the chapter 11 petition on

9 Laura B. Bartell, Straddle Obligations Under Prepetition Contracts: Prepetition Claims, Postpetition
Claims or Administrative Expenses?, 25 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 39, 39 (2008). In the approximately 99% of
the bankruptcy cases that are “voluntary cases,” i.e., cases commenced by the debtor’s filing of a bankruptcy
petition, the date of the petition is the date of the order for relief—the date of cleavage. 11 U.S.C. § 301(b)
(“commencement . . . constitutes an order for relief”); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS
AND FIGURES tbl.7.2 (2012), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/
2012/Table702.pdf.
10 See generally DAVID G. EPSTEIN & STEVE H. NICKLES, PRINCIPLES OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 174–224
(2007) (explaining the chapter 7 bankruptcy process).
11 See Ashland Petroleum Co. v. Appel (In re B & L Oil Co.), 782 F.2d 155, 158 (10th Cir. 1986) (“Once
a petition is filed, debts that arose before the petition may not be satisfied through post-petition transactions.”).
12 For example, the best interests test for confirming a chapter 11 plan requires that any impaired creditor
who votes against a plan receives at least as much as it would receive in a chapter 7 liquidation of the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii). In many cases, the liquidation of the debtor under chapter 7 results in nominal
or nonexistent payments to classes of creditors, so the same result in chapter 11 is not an obstacle to plan
confirmation. See In re Best Prods. Co., 168 B.R. 35, 72 (1994).
13 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (granting a discharge to a chapter 7 debtor of debts that arose prepetition).
14 Id. § 1141(d)(1)(A) (granting a discharge to a chapter 11 debtor of debts that arose prepetition).

EPSTEINARIAILSMITH GALLEYSPROOFS

18

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

2/17/2015 12:59 PM

[Vol. 31

July 13, 2014. Moreover, Double Dave’s chapter 11 plan could not become
effective unless the postpetition debts are paid in full.15
I. CLEAVAGE AND DISCHARGE
As the Casey hypothetical suggests, the cleavage effect of filing a
bankruptcy petition—separating prepetition debts from postpetition debts—is
an integral part of the basic bankruptcy policy of discharge. Recall that Casey’s
discharge only affects prepetition debts.
A discharge is often described as a “fresh start.”16 However, that
description is incomplete. It begs the question: a fresh start from what? It is
more complete to say that a discharge is a fresh start from prepetition debts.17
The following statement by Judge Diane Wood, a Seventh Circuit judge and
former University of Chicago law professor,18 is representative: “[B]ankruptcy
is normally viewed as a process through which a debtor obtains relief from
pre-petition obligations and gets a fresh start in life . . . .”19
While the concept of a fresh start is compelling, it only applies to consumer
debtors. According to the leading bankruptcy scholar Thomas H. Jackson, “the
fresh start policy has nothing to say about business bankruptcies.”20 Professor

15 Id. § 1129(a)(9)(A). Postpetition trade claims are treated as administrative claims. Id. § 364. The
priority for the administrative expense claim depends on whether the debt was incurred in the ordinary course
of business and, in the case of claims arising outside the ordinary course of business, the court’s approval and
the ability of the trustee to obtain unsecured debt. Id. The plan of reorganization must provide that these
administrative expenses are paid in cash on the effective date of the plan. Id. § 1129(a)(9).
16 E.g., Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1985).
17 E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (“[A] discharge [granted under this chapter] discharges the debtor from all
debts that arose before the date of the order for relief . . . .); id. § 301 (defining the date of the order for relief in
a voluntary case as the date the debtor files a bankruptcy petition with the bankruptcy court).
18 She is also a former student of this article’s senior author.
19 In re Duke, 79 F.3d 43, 44 (7th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added); accord Boeing N. Am., Inc. v. Ybarra (In
re Ybarra), 424 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that the question in the discharge context is whether to
release the debtor from “pre-petition debts so that she can be given a fresh start.”); Anthem Life Ins. Co. v.
Izaguirre (In re Izaguirre), 166 B.R. 484, 491 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994) (“The rights of a debtor and a creditor
with respect to liability on particular events or transactions are usually defined by determining on which side
of the time ‘cleavage’ the events or transactions occurred. The purpose of the dividing line is primarily to give
the debtor a fresh start.”). See generally F.H. Buckley, The American Fresh Start, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 67
(1994) (“In bankruptcy, a person is given a fresh start: his pre-petition debts are discharged . . . .”).
20 Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725, 730 n.16 (1986). See
generally THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 225–52 (Beard Books 2001)
(1986) [hereinafter JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS] (discussing the fresh start policy in bankruptcy).
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Jackson’s statement is of course correct,21 albeit somewhat misleading.22
Corporations and other business entities do not receive a fresh start in chapter
7. Section 727, entitled “Discharge,” provides that “[t]he court shall grant the
[chapter 7] debtor a discharge, unless (1) the debtor is not an individual . . . .”23
There are no discharges for business entities in chapter 7 cases; therefore, there
is no fresh start for a business entity in a chapter 7 case. The paradigm for
business entities in chapter 7 is not the fresh start; it is “orderly death.”24 But
business entities are not entirely denied the opportunity to discharge debt
through bankruptcy; business entities can receive a discharge in chapter 11.25
But the discharge effected by the confirmation of a chapter 11 plan is not
exactly a fresh start. A chapter 11 discharge in essence replaces the debtor’s
obligations created prepetition with the new, reduced obligations created by the
plan.26
While the discharge of a business entity in chapter 11, unlike the discharge
of an individual in chapter 7, does not result in a fresh start from prepetition
debts, both reflect the cleavage effect of the filing of a bankruptcy petition.
Chapter 7 and chapter 11 discharges provide the debtor relief from prepetition
debts but not from postpetition debts. After his chapter 7 discharge, Casey has
no personal liability on his prepetition debts.27 After its chapter 11 discharge,
Double Dave’s only liability on its prepetition debts is what it has agreed to
pay under its chapter 11 plan.28
II. CLEAVAGE AND EQUALITY OF DISTRIBUTION
Even more important than the cleavage effect of a bankruptcy petition on
the rights of prepetition and postpetition creditors against the debtor is the
21 E.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 363 (3d Cir. 2001)
(Cowen, J., dissenting) (“Corporations do not get fresh starts.”).
22 See Lawrence Ponoroff, Vicarious Thrills: The Case for Application of Agency Rules in Bankruptcy
Dischargeability Litigation, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2515, 2521 (1996) (“[T]he bankruptcy fresh start does not mean
the same thing in corporate and other entity bankruptcies as it does for the individual debtor.”).
23 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (2012).
24 COMM’N ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS
OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. I, 72 (1973), reprinted in 2 BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF
1978: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, Doc. 21 (Alan N. Resnick & Eugene M. Wypyski eds. 1979) (“[T]he
bankruptcy process provides for the orderly death . . . .”).
25 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A) (“[T]he confirmation of a plan—discharges the debtor from any debt that
arose before the date of such confirmation . . . .”).
26 Id. § 1141(d).
27 See id. § 727(b).
28 See id. § 1141(d).
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cleavage effect of a bankruptcy petition on the relative rights of creditors. As
one bankruptcy court observed, “[T]he entire bankruptcy process is based upon
a division in time, with claims that arose prepetition against the debtor being
treated in one manner and claims that arose against the estate postpetition
being treated in a different manner.”29 The similar treatment of similarly
situated creditors is a fundamental tenet of bankruptcy law, with the date of
cleavage—i.e., the filing of a bankruptcy petition—being the most important
method of grouping like with like.30
The filing of a bankruptcy petition protects a prepetition creditor from other
prepetition creditors. One early twentieth century commentator explained the
elements of bankruptcy by stating: “All bankruptcy law . . . no matter when or
where devised and enacted, has at least two general objects in view. . . . [It]
seeks to protect the creditors, first, from one another and, secondly, from their
debtor.”31
Bankruptcy remains a creditor’s remedy today. As Professor Thomas
Jackson observed, “Bankruptcy, at first glance, may be thought of as a
procedure geared principally toward relieving an overburdened debtor from
‘oppressive’ debt. Yet . . . most of the bankruptcy process is in fact concerned
with creditor-distribution questions.”32 More specifically, it is concerned with
questions relating to distributions to prepetition creditors. Unlike state debt
collection law, which focuses on each individual creditor’s rights vis-à-vis the
debtor, bankruptcy focuses on the rights of all prepetition creditors as a
group.33 That is to say, it is a collective remedy.34

29

In re Sturgis Iron & Metal Co., 420 B.R. 716, 749 n.63 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2009).
See Howard C. Buschman III, Benefits and Burdens: Post-Petition Performance of Unassumed
Executory Contracts, 5 BANKR. DEV. J. 341, 341 (1988).
31 Louis Edward Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 223, 225 (1918).
32 Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91 YALE
L.J. 857, 857 (1982); see also Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 785 (1987).
30

In bankruptcy, with an inadequate pie to divide and the looming discharge of unpaid debts, the
disputes center on who is entitled to shares of the debtor’s assets and how those shares are to be
divided. Distribution among creditors is not incidental to other concerns; it is the center of the
bankruptcy scheme.
Id.

33 JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 20, at 10 (“The basic problem that bankruptcy law is
designed to handle, both as a normative matter and as a positive matter, is that the system of individual creditor
remedies may be bad for the creditors as a group . . . . Bankruptcy law responds to this problem.”).
34 E.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795, 823 (2004)
(“collective process that is bankruptcy”); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World,
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Under state law, the race for the debtor’s assets goes to the swiftest.35 The
first creditors to obtain and execute a judgment by seizing the debtor’s assets
are satisfied in full, while the creditors who are late to the party often get
nothing.36 Thus, once the debtor is perceived to be in a financially shaky
position, state “grab” law encourages the piecemeal and potentially wasteful
dismemberment of the debtor’s property.37
Federal bankruptcy law takes a different approach to debt collection. It
seeks to get the most value out of the debtor’s assets for the benefit of all of the
debtor’s prepetition creditors.38 This requires that individual collection efforts
be held at bay while the debtor’s assets are liquidated by a neutral trustee39 in
an orderly fashion (chapter 7), or while the debtor has the opportunity to
rehabilitate and return to some semblance of financial viability and make
payments to prepetition creditors under a court-approved plan (chapters 11, 12,
and 13).40 The filing of a bankruptcy petition results in an automatic stay,41
which protects each prepetition creditor from collection initiatives by other
prepetition creditors against the debtor.42

92 MICH. L. REV. 336, 370 (1993) (“collective process of bankruptcy”); see JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS,
supra note 20, at 17.
35 See ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS:
TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 46 (6th ed. 2009) (“In general, the rule in state collection law is the rule
elsewhere in law: ‘First in time, first in right,’ or, in its earthier version, ‘The fastest dog gets fed first.’”).
36 See id. (“In general, the state law system provides for no sharing, does not listen to hard luck stories
about which creditor was out of town or was trying to help the debtor, and makes very little assessment of
which creditors are more deserving.”).
37 Susan Block-Lieb, Fishing in Muddy Waters: Clarifying the Common Pool Analogy as Applied to the
Standard for Commencement of a Bankruptcy Case, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 337, 355–56 (1993) (“Pursuit of
various state law remedies such as execution, attachment, garnishment, levy, and the like may involve a ‘race
to the courthouse’ by a debtor’s creditors, with the creditors who win the race entitled to ‘grab’ the debtor’s
assets away from the debtor’s slower creditors.”).
38 In re Dow Corning Corp., 255 B.R. 445 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (“A chapter 7 trustee’s fiduciary duty goes
to both the creditors and the debtor in order to maximize the value of the estate.” (citing Myers v. Martin (In re
Martin), 91 F.3d 389, 394 (3d Cir. 1996))); In re Atlanta Packaging Prods., Inc., 99 B.R. 124, 131 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1988) (“It is a well-established principle of bankruptcy law that the objective of bankruptcy sales and
the trustee’s duty with respect to such sales is to obtain the highest price or greatest overall benefit possible for
the estate.” (citing In re Blue Coal Corp., 59 B.R. 157, 162 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1986))); JACKSON, LOGIC AND
LIMITS, supra note 20, at 14–15.
39 11 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).
40 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.03 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommers eds., 16th ed. 2010).
41 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), (c).
42 WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 35, at 407 (“Naturally creditors do all they can to avoid the effect
of the [automatic] stay, but they have to remember that the Bankruptcy Code protects an ‘estate’ that
represents a host of creditors and other interests, not just the debtor.”).
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For bankruptcy’s collective process to work effectively, prepetition
creditors are required to be treated with substantial equality not only in terms
of what they can do during the bankruptcy but also in terms of what they
receive from the bankruptcy case.43 Indeed, equality of distribution is
consistently described as an important, even the most important, purpose of
bankruptcy.44 The Supreme Court in Bailey v. Glover stated: “It is obviously
one of the purposes of the Bankrupt law, that there should be a speedy
disposition of the bankrupt’s assets. This is only second in importance to
securing equality of distribution.”45
While the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) does not use the phrase “equality
of distribution,” most Code provisions46 and most court orders in bankruptcy
cases47 are consistent with a policy of equality of distribution among
prepetition creditors. There are also, however, provisions in the Code and court
orders in bankruptcy cases that are consistent with the policy of equality of
distribution only in the Animal Farm sense of that phrase: “All animals are
equal but some animals are more equal than others.”48
This essay focuses on two such “more equal animals”: vendors and lessors.
The Code in essence treats the prepetition unsecured claims of vendors and
lessors as if their prepetition claims are postpetition claims, which we submit is
inconsistent not only with the cleavage effect of bankruptcy but also the
policies of fresh start and equality of distribution.
III. WHICH CLAIMS OF VENDORS AND LESSORS ARE PREPETITION UNSECURED
CLAIMS?
Because various Code sections treat prepetition unsecured claims
differently from and less favorably than postpetition unsecured claims, a
43

See JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 20, at 151–52.
See Begier v. I.R.S., 496 U.S. 53, 58 (1990) (“Equality of distribution among creditors is a central
policy of the Bankruptcy Code.”); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 178 (1977) (“the prime bankruptcy policy of
equality of distribution among creditors”), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138; see also JACKSON,
LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 20, at 29–30 (describing the pro rata treatment of unsecured creditors as “the
most common—and uncontroversial—of bankruptcy’s policies”); Westbrook, supra note 34 (“[B]ankruptcy
has as a major purpose equality of distribution to all those within a legal ‘class’ of creditors. That is, those with
equal rights should receive equal treatment.”).
45 88 U.S. 342, 346 (1874) (emphasis added).
46 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 547–51 (preferences and fraudulent transfers); id. §§ 1122(a), 1123(a)(4)
(grouping “substantially similar” claims for similar treatment in chapter 11 plans).
47 E.g., In re Quigley Co., 377 B.R. 110, 116–17 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
48 GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 133 (Signet Classic 50th Anniversary ed. 1996) (1946).
44
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considerable body of law has developed as to which unsecured claims are
prepetition and which unsecured claims are postpetition. The following two
examples illustrate the point:
(1) A day before filing his chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on January
15, Casey buys two pairs of underwear from Sears online, using
his Sears card. Even though the underwear arrives on January 17,
and the Sears bill arrives on January 30, Sears is a prepetition
creditor. The Code’s definition of “claim” includes an unmatured
right to payment,49 and Sears had an unmatured right to payment
when Casey ordered the underwear on January 14.
(2) In 2013, Libby leases a building to Double Dave for seven years,
with rent payable at the end of each month. Double Dave files for
bankruptcy on July 13, 2014. Double Dave’s motion to reject (i.e.,
breach50) the Libby lease is approved by the bankruptcy court as
provided in § 365(a).51 Libby’s claim for unpaid rent that accrued
prior to filing for bankruptcy, rent that accrues after filing, and the
remaining rent not yet accrued all become prepetition claims.
Again, Libby had an unmatured right to payment when Double
Dave signed the lease.
As these examples show, vendor orders and unexpired leases give rise to
prepetition claims under the Code.52 However, the fact that they have
prepetition claims tells us nothing about whether these claims are secured or
unsecured.
Both vendors like Sears and lessors like Libby can have prepetition
unsecured claims, prepetition secured claims, or both. Indeed, the same
transaction can often give rise to both a secured claim and an unsecured claim.
For example, assume that on December 7, 2013, Casey buys a Kenmore
refrigerator from Sears on credit and grants Sears a security interest in the
refrigerator. When Casey files for chapter 7 bankruptcy in 2014, he still owes

49

11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A).
Badami v. Sears (In re AFY, Inc.), 461 B.R. 541, 549 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2012) (“Rejection of the
agreement constitutes a breach.”).
51 11 U.S.C. § 365(a). Under § 365, Double Dave also has an opportunity to assume (i.e., keep) or assign
(i.e., transfer) the lease. Id. § 365(a), (f).
52 Id. §§ 101(5)(A), 365(a).
50
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Sears $700 and the refrigerator has a value of $300. In Casey’s bankruptcy,
Sears has a secured claim of $300 and an unsecured claim of $400.53
Similarly, assume that Libby’s lease required Double Dave to post a
security deposit of $10,000, which it did. In Double Dave’s bankruptcy Libby
would then have a $10,000 secured claim.54 The remainder of Libby’s claim
under the prepetition lease would then be a prepetition unsecured claim.55 The
remaining parts of this Article deal only with the prepetition unsecured claims
of vendors and lessors in chapter 11 cases.
IV. PREPETITION UNSECURED CLAIMS OF VENDORS
The bankruptcy law with respect to prepetition unsecured claims of vendors
is, in significant respects, inconsistent with both (1) the concept that a
bankruptcy filing cleaves prepetition debts from postpetition debts and (2) the
bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution. Outside of bankruptcy, a seller of
goods for unsecured credit has no special claim to payment or to the goods.56
The relative state law rights of an unsecured vendor and other unsecured
creditors would depend on which creditor obtained its lien first57—vendors get
no special treatment. Bankruptcy law, however, treats certain prepetition
unsecured claims of vendors as if they were postpetition claims. Those vendors
receiving special treatment under the Code fall into two categories: critical
vendors and § 503(b)(9) vendors (or “20-day vendors”). The claims of these
“more equal animals” are treated differently and better than similarly situated
unsecured creditors. The rest of this Part will outline the history of this special
treatment and discuss their underlying policy rationales.

53

Id. § 506(a).
Even though Libby holds the security deposit, it becomes property of the estate under § 541, which
brings into the bankruptcy estate all property “wherever located and by whomever held” in which the debtor
has a legal or equitable interest as of the bankruptcy filing. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). Since Double Dave has an
interest in the return of its security deposit, the deposit becomes property of the estate, and Libby has a secured
claim for the full amount. Id. § 506(a).
55 Id. § 506(a) (granting an unsecured claim to the “extent that the value of such creditor’s interest . . . is
less than the amount of [the] allowed [secured] claim”).
56 Under the U.C.C., there is a limited reclamation exception for a seller who delivered goods to an
insolvent buyer. See generally Lawrence Ponoroff, Reclaim This! Getting Credit Seller Rights in Bankruptcy
Right, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 733 (2014).
57 WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 35.
54
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A. Railroads
It all started with railroads. Railroads were the nineteenth century
institutions viewed as “too big to fail.”58 Nonetheless, in the nineteenth and
into the twentieth century, railroads did fail—at least fail to pay their
creditors.59 When railroads were unable to pay their creditors, bankruptcy was
not an alternative—railroads were expressly excluded from filing for
bankruptcy until 1933.60 Instead, railroads made use of receiverships.61
There are numerous books and law review articles that debate the
importance of these railroad receiverships to the evolution of basic concepts of
business bankruptcies.62 This essay does not go into them in depth. However,
two important concepts arose during that period: the six months rule and the
necessity of payment rule. This essay simply shows the connections between
these two nineteenth century rules and the twenty-first century business
bankruptcy’s critical vendor orders and § 503(b)(9). While the impetus for
these rules is grounded in the evolution of nineteenth century bankruptcy
policy, their usefulness for modern business bankruptcies is not justified.
1. Six Months Rule
The six months rule developed from the common practice by courts of
initiating railroad receiverships with an order appointing a receiver and
authorizing him to pay certain expenses incurred in the preceding six months.
These expenses were paid prior to paying the claims of secured bondholders.
This policy arose to combat the pervasive practice by failing railroad
companies of paying the interest on their mortgages and ignoring bills for

58 Joseph R. Mason & Daniel A. Schiffman, Too Big to Fail, Government Bailouts, and Managerial
Incentives: The Case of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Assistance to the Railroad Industry During
the Great Depression, in TOO BIG TO FAIL: POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS 49, 50
(Benton E. Gup ed., 2003); see also Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, New Albany & Chi. Ry. Co., 174 U.S.
674, 682 (1899) (“[A] railroad is not simply private property, but also an instrument of public service . . . .”).
59 See Stephen J. Lubben, Railroad Receiverships and Modern Bankruptcy Theory, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
1420, 1435 (2004) (noting that over reliance on secured debt “increased the chances of default in times of
economic disturbance”).
60 Act of Mar. 3, 1933, Pub. L. No. 72-420, § 77, 47 Stat. 1467, 1474 (1933); see JAMES ANGELL
MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 2 (1956).
61 See Lubben, supra note 59, at 1423 (noting that approximately half of the largest railroads “went
through a receivership between 1890 and this country’s entry into World War I”).
62 See, e.g., DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 48–
70 (2001); Daniel J. Bussel, Coalition-Building Through Bankruptcy Creditors’ Committees, 43 UCLA L.
REV. 1547, 1552–59 (1996).
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ongoing operating expenses such as labor and supplies.63 This practice was
seemingly based on the “hope . . . that a more favorable time in the business of
the roads would enable them to make up the deficiency.”64 Railroad companies
would sometimes defer paying their operating expenses for many months
before a receiver was appointed. In approving such an order, Turner v.
Indianapolis B. & W. Railway Co. explicitly identified this practice as the
rationale behind the six months rule. It stated:
[T]hose who had control of the railways, instead of paying the current
operating expenses of the companies would postpone the payment of
the same, sometimes for many months, in favor of the interest due on
the mortgages . . . . It is for these and other like reasons that the court
in the appointment of receivers in all cases of railroads in this circuit
has required them . . . to pay for labor performed, or supplies or
materials furnished during the time indicated.65

The court in Turner invited a review of the six months rule by the Supreme
Court.66 One year later in 1879, Fosdick v. Schall67 provided such a review.
Under Fosdick, a court could condition the appointment of a receiver on the
use of the railroad’s income during the receivership on “outstanding debts for
labor, supplies, equipment, or permanent improvement of the mortgaged
property.”68 The Court in Fosdick, like the court in Turner, then noted that
often debts for labor and supplies are deferred so that bond interest may be
paid and foreclosure postponed.69 The Court explained the legal importance of
this common railroad practice:

63

Turner v. Indianapolis, B. & W. Ry. Co., 24 F. Cas. 366, 367 (C.C.D. Ind. 1878) (No. 14,258).
Id.
65 Id. The “time indicated”—six months—was based on an Illinois statute. Id. at 366 (“[R]easonable
time . . . as by analogy, the rule of the statute in Illinois.”); cf. S. Ry. Co. v. Carnegie Steel Co., 176 U.S. 257,
292–93 (1900).
64

[S]uch temporary credits accruing prior to the appointment of the receiver must be recognized by
the mortgagees and such claims preferred. Now, for what time prior to the appointment of a
receiver may these credits be sustained? There is no arbitrary time prescribed, and it should be
only such reasonable time as, in the nature of things and in the ordinary course of business,
would be sufficient to have such claims settled and paid. Six months is the longest time I have
noticed as yet given. Ordinarily, I think that is ample. Perhaps, in some large concerns, with
extensive lines of road and a complicated business, a longer time might be necessary.
Id. (quoting Blair v. St. Louis, H. & K. Ry. Co., 22 F. 471, 474 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1884)).
66 Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 367 (“desirable to obtain from the [S]upreme [C]ourt a decision”).
67 99 U.S. 235 (1879).
68 Id. at 251–52.
69 Id.
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In this way the daily and monthly earnings, which ordinarily should
go to pay the daily and monthly expenses, are kept from those to
whom in equity they belong, and used to pay the mortgage debt. . . .
If for the convenience of the moment something is taken from what
may not improperly be called the current debt fund, and put into that
which belongs to the mortgage creditors, it certainly is not
inequitable for the court, when asked by the mortgagees to take
possession of the future income and hold it for their benefit, to
require as a condition of such an order that what is due from the
earnings to the current debt shall be paid by the court from the future
current receipts before anything derived from that source goes to the
mortgagees.70

The six months rule, as stated in Fosdick, is based on a principle from
mortgage law: “[T]hat the mortgagee’s interest attaches to net income, which
arises only after the payment from gross earnings for all necessary operating
and managing expenses, proper equipment, and useful improvements.”71 As
such, Fosdick’s approval of the six months rule stems from equitable principles
based on mortgage law—not reorganization policies. As stated by the First
Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Boston & Maine Corp.:72
The Fosdick rule is one of equitable restitution; in receivership the
mortgagee must restore to operating creditors revenues diverted to
the mortgagee’s advantage . . . . The receivership furnishes the
occasion and judicial means of effecting the equitable restitution, but
mortgage law, not the special principles governing the administration
of railroad receiverships, is the source of the right to restitution.73

Not all commentators have agreed with this characterization of the six months
rule. A year after Boston & Maine, Robert W. Blanchette, a leader of the
railroad bankruptcy bar who served as trustee in the Penn Central
70

Id.
In re Bos. & Me. Corp., 634 F.2d 1359, 1368 (1st Cir. 1980) (discussing Fosdick, 99 U.S. at 235). The
court went on to state:
71

[T]o the extent that before or during receivership bonded interest has been paid, additional
equipment provided, or lasting and valuable improvements in the mortgaged property have been
made out of earnings which ought in equity to have been used to pay debts for labor, supplies and
the like, the receivership court can use receivership income . . . to pay the debts that, but for the
diversion of funds, would have been paid in the ordinary course of business. . . .
Id.

72

Id. at 1359.
Id. at 1368–69, 1377; see also 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 40, at ¶ 1171.02 (“The Fosdick
rationale specifically rested on the debtor’s diversion of funds from the payment of current operating expenses
in order to pay a mortgagee . . . .”).
73
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bankruptcy,74 was less certain about the conceptual basis for the six months
rule: “The rationale underlying the rule has been variously explained. . . .
Frequently, the above rationales are combined or confused.”75
The conceptual basis for the bankruptcy receivership’s six months rule is of
limited, direct practical significance. Bankruptcy law has replaced
receiverships for railroad reorganizations76 and provides a statutory basis for
the six months rule. In 1933, Congress enacted § 77 providing for the
reorganization of interstate railroads under the Bankruptcy Act.77 Section 77
did not promulgate a statutory version of the six months rule. Instead, the
following language in § 77 was read as making the six months rule a part of
railroad reorganizations in bankruptcy:
For all purposes of this section unsecured claims, which would have
been entitled to priority if a receiver in equity of the property of the
debtor had been appointed by a Federal court on the day of the
approval of the petition, shall be entitled to such priority and the
holders of such claims shall be treated as a separate class or classes of
creditors.78

As the italicized words indicate, the Bankruptcy Act limited the application of
the six months rule to railroad reorganizations under § 77 and limited the effect
of the six months rule to a priority—not a right to immediate payment.
The modern iteration of the Code retains the language of § 77 of the prior
Act. Referring to railroad reorganization, § 1171 of the present Code parallels
the older language, stating:
Any unsecured claim against the debtor that would have been entitled
to priority if a receiver in equity of the property of the debtor had
74

Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 106 (1974).
Robert W. Blanchette & Clifford W. Losh, Railroad Reorganization, 1981 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L.
171, 188–89.
76 See VERN COUNTRYMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DEBTOR AND CREDITOR 302 (1964) (contending
that after railroads were eligible for bankruptcy relief there was no need to “further resort to the federal
consent receivership”).
77 Lloyd K. Garrison, Department of Current Legislation: The Recent Amendments to the Bankruptcy
Act, 19 A.B.A. J. 330, 330 (1933). The term “Bankruptcy Act” is generally used to refer to the bankruptcy
statute first enacted in 1898 and amended significantly thereafter. Roger G. Evans, Bankruptcy the American
Way: An Introductory Guide, 11 JUTA’S BUS. L. 173, 174 (2003).
78 11 U.S.C. § 205(b) (1976) (repealed 1978) (emphasis added). When first enacted in 1933, the
provision appeared in § 77(c), and the first part of the sentence read: “For all purposes of this section claims
against a railroad corporation which would have been entitled to priority over existing mortgages if a receiver
in equity of the property of the debtor had been appointed by a Federal Court . . . .” Act of Mar. 3, 1933, Pub.
L. No. 420, § 77(c), 47 Stat. 1474, 1477 (repealed 1978).
75
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been appointed by a Federal court on the date of the order for relief
under this title shall be entitled to the same priority in the case under
this chapter.79

Note that § 1171 of the Code, like § 77 of the former Bankruptcy Act, provides
a priority, not a right to payment.
And like Bankruptcy Act § 77, Code § 1171(b) provides no guidance as to
when unsecured claims “would have been entitled to priority if a receiver in
equity . . . had been appointed.”80 As the legislative history of the Code
explains, “As under [§ 77], the courts will determine the precise contours of
the priority recognized by this subsection in each case.”81
The last reported opinion granting creditors priority under the six months
rule is a 1988 opinion, In re Michigan Interstate Railway Co.,82 by Judge
Steven Rhodes.83 The opinion does not identify precise contours of the right to
priority created by the six months rule. Instead, Judge Rhodes concluded that
the courts had failed to coalesce around a meaningful standard, stating:
[I]t is difficult, if not impossible, to identify from the prior decisions
any unified principle or group of principles to be applied when a
claimant requests priority for a pre-petition claim in a railroad
reorganization pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1171(b). Plainly, each case
has been decided based upon its unique facts and based upon the
court’s analysis of the equities asserted by each of the competing
parties.84
79

11 U.S.C. § 1171(b) (2012) (emphasis added); see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 424 (1977)
(“Subsection (b) follows present section 77(b) of the Bankruptcy Act . . . .”). While language limiting its
application to railroad reorganizations is missing from § 1171, there is such limiting language in § 103(h). 11
U.S.C. § 103(h) (“Subchapter IV of chapter 11 of this title applies only in a case under such chapter
concerning a railroad.”). As § 1171 falls under Subchapter IV of chapter 11, the limitation to railroad
reorganizations applies.
80 11 U.S.C. § 1171.
81 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 424 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6380.
82 87 B.R. 921 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988).
83 See generally Tom Hals, Steven Rhodes, Detroit Bankruptcy Judge, Has Strong Record, Known as a
Stickler, HUFFINGTON POST (July 24, 2013, 7:01 AM EDT), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/24/
steven-rhodes-judge-detroit-bankruptcy_n_3643284.html.
84 Michigan Interstate Ry. Co., 87 B.R. at 925 (citations omitted); see also S. Ry. Co. v. Carnegie Steel
Co., 176 U.S. 257, 292 (1900) (noting each case “must depend largely on its special facts”). But cf. Russell A.
Eisenberg & Frances F. Gecker, The Doctrine of Necessity and its Parameters, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 4 (1989).
The preceding article, co-authored by a bankruptcy judge, provided the following summary of case law on the
six months rule:
The Six Months Rule requires that “the creditor must have expected to be paid out of the current
operating receipts of the railroad rather than from the general credit of the railroad” and that “a
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While courts and commentators are uncertain as to the present contours of
the six months rule, they are certain that it now merely provides a priority and
not a right to immediate payment.85 Instead, the railroad receivership
antecedent to any present day right to immediate payment of a prepetition
unsecured claim is the “necessity of payment” rule.
2. Necessity of Payment Rule
Just as the term “six months rule” nowhere appears in Fosdick, the term
“necessity of payment” nowhere appears in Miltenberger v. Logansport
Railway Co.,86 the seminal case on the necessity of payment rule.87
Miltenberger involved an appeal of an order directing a railroad receiver’s
immediate payment of certain pre-receivership claims. In approving the
payments, the Court gave the following justification,
Many circumstances may exist which may make it necessary and
indispensable to the business of the road and the preservation of the
property, for the receiver to pay pre-existing debts . . . where a
stoppage of the continuance of such business relations would be a
probable result, in case of non-payment.88

Miltenberg was decided after Fosdick but does not cite Fosdick. That is
understandable. There are very different bases for the two decisions. Recall
Fosdick’s focus on the relative rights of various creditors and on prereceivership “diversion” from vendors and other unsecured creditors to secured
creditors, i.e., using unencumbered operating income to pay interest on secured
bonds instead of to pay vendors and other unsecured creditors.89 By contrast,

current debt fund must exist.” The debt fund is limited to “current or surplus earnings during the
six months prior to reorganization and during reorganization; unmortgaged assets of the debtor;
and income diverted for the benefit of mortgagees of the debtor during the reorganization or the
six months prior to the reorganization.”
Id. (citations omitted).
85 See, e.g., Alco Prods. v. Trs. of the Prop. of the N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co. (In re N.Y.,
New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co.), 405 F.2d 50, 51–52 (2d Cir. 1968) (“The six-months rule stated briefly,
gives priority in payment to creditors . . . .”); Alan N. Resnick, The Future of the Doctrine of Necessity and
Critical-Vendor Payments in Chapter 11 Cases, 47 B.C. L. REV. 183, 188 (2005) (“[T]he six months rule
directly changes the priority of claims . . . .”).
86 106 U.S. 286 (1882).
87 Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 84, at 3 (“The United States Supreme Court first articulated the
Necessity of Payment Rule in Miltenberger v. Logansport Railway.”).
88 Miltenberger, 106 U.S. at 311–12.
89 Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U.S. 235, 252–53 (1879).
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Miltenberg’s focus was on what payments were necessary to keep the railroad
operating, not the relative rights of secured and unsecured creditors.90
And, in Miltenberg as in Fosdick, the Court emphasized that the debtor was
a railroad and emphasized the public interest in and need for a railroad.91 The
Court compared a railroad with a public highway.92 Grounded in this public
interest rationale, it would seem that the necessity of payment rule, like the six
months rule priority, would be limited to cases in which the debtor was a
railroad. And, courts consistently so held until 1945.93
B. Non-Railroad Business Debtors
1. From Necessity of Payment Rule in Railroad Cases to Critical Vendor
Orders in Chapter 11 Business Cases
In 1945, Dudley v. Mealey, a Second Circuit panel of Judges Jerome Frank,
August Hand, and Learned Hand held that these railroad receivership concepts
could also be used by courts in business bankruptcy cases.94 In Dudley, the
court first expressly acknowledged that in “a number of instances courts have
refused to extend this doctrine to private corporations” and that the “priority
primarily rested” on “the interest of the public in the continued operation of
railroads.”95 Then the court pivoted, switching from the interest of the public to
the interest of the secured creditors. According to the court, protecting the
“interest of the lienors” necessitates protection of the supply creditors.96 This
justification is all the more compelling in a reorganization of the business,
because the “very purpose of the action is to continue the existing business in

90 Miltenberger, 106 U.S. at 311 (“Many circumstances may exist which may make it necessary . . . for
the receiver to pay preexisting debts of certain classes, out of the earnings of the receivership, or even the
corpus of the property, under the order of the court, with a priority of lien.”).
91 Id. at 311–12; Fosdick, 99 U.S. at 251–52.
92 Miltenberger, 106 U.S. at 313 (the “public interest in such a highway for public use as a railroad”). A
year earlier, the Court had stated that a “railroad is authorized to be constructed more for the public good to be
subserved, than for private gain. . . . It is, therefore, a matter of public right by which the courts . . . authorize
the receiver . . . so that the public may not suffer detriment . . . .” Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 135 (1881).
93 See, e.g., In re Bos. & Me. Corp., 634 F.2d 1359, 1377 (1st Cir. 1980) (“peculiarly a principle of
railroad receivership”); Int’l Trust Co. v. Decker Bros., 152 F. 78, 82–83 (9th Cir. 1907) (“The reasons,
however, for the authority are peculiar to railroad corporations . . . the most salient of which are that railroads
are quasi public concerns, through which the public interest and convenience, as well as private ownership, are
largely subserved . . . .”).
94 147 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1945).
95 Id. at 271.
96 Id.
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the interest of the secured creditors . . . .”97 The court then held that “so far as
the supply creditors furnished their goods of their services within a short
period of the receivership—six months is the limit—and so far as these were
necessary to keep the [business] open, they were proper preferred claims.”98
Notice that Dudley, like Fosdick, the Supreme Court’s six months rule
decision, focuses on the needs of the secured creditors—the importance of
preserving the going concern value for the secured creditors.99 And notice, the
court’s reference to both “six months” and “necessary.” Commentators are
divided as to whether Dudley extends the six months rule or the necessity of
payment rule to businesses other than railroads.100
While other scholars were still debating which rule formed the basis for the
Dudley opinion, it was clear to Judge Burton Lifland101 that the Dudley opinion
extended the necessity of payment rule. The next reported opinion with a
reasoned extension of the necessity of payment rule to non-railroad businesses
was a 1989102 opinion by Judge Lifland in the bankruptcy case involving
Eastern Air Lines and its affiliates.103
The opinion acknowledges104 but does not rely on the obvious similarity of
railroads and airlines.105 Instead, Judge Lifland refers to and relies on Dudley,

97

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
99 Compare id. (“to continue the existing business in the interest of secured creditors”), with Fosdick v.
Schall, 99 U.S. 235, 251 (1879) (“[The receiver] holds, pending the litigation, for the benefit of whomsoever in
the end it shall be found to concern . . . .”).
100 Compare Shirley S. Cho, The Intersection of Critical Vendor Orders and Bankruptcy Code
§ 503(b)(9), 29 CAL. BANKR. J. 7, 8 (2007) (“Judge Learned Hand’s decision in Dudley v. Mealey extended
applicability of the doctrine of necessity to non-railroad bankruptcy cases . . . .”), with Resnick, supra note 85
(“In Dudley v. Mealey, a 1945 decision written by Learned Hand and joined by Jerome Frank and Augustus
Hand, involving the application of the six months rule, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for the first
time extended the six months rule to a nonrailroad reorganization case with the goal of encouraging successful
reorganization.”) (emphasis added).
101 See generally Seth Lubove, A Bankrupt’s Best Friend, FORBES, Apr. 1, 1991; Douglas Martin, Burton
R. Lifland, Bankruptcy Judge in Big Cases, Dies at 84, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/01/15/business/burton-r-lifland-bankruptcy-judge-dies-at-84.html.
102 In that time gap, there were reported cases refusing to extend the necessity of payment doctrine to nonrailroad debtors. See, e.g., B & W Enters. Inc. v. Goodman Oil Co. (In re B & W Enters. Inc.), 713 F.2d 534,
537 (9th Cir. 1983) (“would decline to apply it beyond the context of railroad reorganizations”); In re Yale
Express Sys., Inc., 342 F. Supp. 972, 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (“Subsequent cases have indicated that Dudley
should be limited to its or closely analogous facts.”).
103 In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. 174 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989).
104 Id. at 176 (“Clearly, the ‘necessity of payment doctrine’ is applicable to the instant dispute which is
related in some aspects to the Railway Labor Act.”).
98
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stating that the necessity of payment doctrine would be “applicable under the
rationale of Judge Learned Hand who applied [the necessity of payment
doctrine] to a non-railroad debtor in Dudley v. Mealey.”106 He then described
the rationale of Dudley and of chapter 11 as the rehabilitation of the debtor.107
Unlike the Dudley decision, there is no mention of the “interests of the
lienors”108 or to “continue the existing business in the interest of the secured
creditors—and, as here, of them alone.”109 The opinion instead emphasizes the
importance to all creditors in all chapter 11 cases of the survival of the debtor
as an operating business—not similarities between airlines and railroads.110
Of course, as any air traveler knows, Eastern Air Lines did not survive.111
And, unlike the holders of prepetition unsecured claims paid in full in 1989
under the necessity of payment doctrine, all of the other creditors in the
Eastern Air Lines bankruptcy with prepetition unsecured claims received plan
distributions valued at 11 cents on the dollar in 1994.112
Nonetheless, after the Eastern Air Lines bankruptcy, other bankruptcy
judges (primarily, but not exclusively,113 in the Southern District of New York
and Delaware) issued similar orders approving the immediate payment in full
of prepetition claims of not only employees but also vendors, for the same
reason—survival of the debtor as an operating business.114 Many of them did

105

See Charles Jordan Tabb, Emergency Preferential Orders in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 65 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 75, 100 (1991) (“Perhaps an Eastern Airlines case is sufficiently similar to the railroad cases to
merit the exercise of the same type of extraordinary power . . . . But even Judge Lifland does not rely on an
overriding public interest rationale . . . .”)
106 Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. at 176.
107 See id.
108 Compare Dudley v. Mealey, 147 F.2d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 1945) (“interests of the lienors”), with
Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. at 174 (containing no comparable language).
109 Compare Dudley, 147 F.2d at 271, with Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. at 176 (discussing the
necessity of payment doctrine as being in the interest of “all parties” and not specifically for the benefit of
secured creditors).
110 Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. at 176.
111 See generally AARON BERNSTEIN, GROUNDED: FRANK LORENZO AND THE DESTRUCTION OF EASTERN
AIRLINES (1990).
112 See Scott Thurston, Eastern, Unsecured Creditors OK Plan, 11 Cents to Be Paid on Each Dollar,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept. 28, 1994, at D1 (reporting that five and one-half years after Eastern Air Lines
entered bankruptcy, unsecured creditors had finally approved an 11 cents on the dollar payment plan). See
generally Robert K. Rasmussen, The Efficiency of Chapter 11, 8 BANKR. DEV. J. 319 (1991) (describing the
Eastern Air Lines bankruptcy as a “fiasco”).
113 See, e.g., In re Payless Cashways, Inc., 268 B.R. 543 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2001) (approving payment of
prepetition claims of lumber vendors).
114 See, e.g., In re Just for Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. 821, 826 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999).
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not have published opinions or appeals.115 In a widely cited law review article,
Judge Russell Eisenberg and Frances Gecker concluded that the use of the
doctrine of necessity in non-railroad business cases was “well-established in
bankruptcy common law.”116 They based their conclusion on “all possible
sources, such as numerous unreported decisions, orders, motions, briefs,
discussions with bankruptcy judges and lawyers experienced in the use of the
Doctrine, and extensive personal experience.”117
Some lawyers and judges used the term “doctrine of necessity,” instead of
“necessity of payment” to distinguish non-railroad cases from railroad cases.118
Some lawyers and judges used the term “critical vendor orders”119 to
distinguish orders approving payment of claims of prepetition vendors from
payments of prepetition claims of employees.120 Regardless of what they were
called, the practice of paying certain privileged unsecured creditors in cash at
the start of the bankruptcy case became widespread. As Professor Douglas
Baird has observed:

The Debtors need a continuous supply of inventory from athletic footwear and apparel vendors
such as Nike, New Balance, Fila, Reebok, Adidas, Asics, K–Swiss and Converse. [The debtor’s
CEO] testified that without new merchandise from these vendors, Just For Feet will not survive.
Therefore, the court finds that payment of the pre-petition claims of certain trade vendors—the
athletic footwear and apparel vendors—is essential to the survival of the debtor during the
chapter 11 reorganization.
Id.; see also Philippe Belanger, Critical Suppliers: What Does Section 11.4 CCAA Mean?, 26 BANKING & FIN.
L. REV. 1, 7 (2010) (“The matter of Just for Feet constitutes a good example of the rationale often followed by
U.S. [c]ourts to justify critical vendor payments.”).
115 See, e.g., Order Confirming Amended Plan of Liquidation, In re Acme Metals Inc., No. 9802179(MFW) (Bankr. D. Del. May 1, 2002); Order Confirming Second Amended Plan or Reorganization of
Goss Realty LLC under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, In re Goss Graphic Sys., Inc., No. 99-02756-PJW
(Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 4, 1999); In re Discovery Zone, Inc., No. 99-00941(JJF) (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 20, 1999);
In re WSR Corp., No. 98-1241(MFW) (Bankr. D. Del. June 10, 1998); In re FF Holdings Corp., No. 9837(JJF) (D. Del. Jan. 7, 1998).
116 Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 84, at 1.
117 Id. at 2.
118 Id. at 2–3; see also In re CoServ, 273 B.R. 487, 492–93 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002) (distinguishing the
doctrine of necessity from the necessity of payment rule).
119 In re Wehrenberg, Inc., 260 B.R. 468, 469 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2001), is the first opinion reported on
Westlaw to approve a motion to pay the prepetition claims of “critical vendors.” Professor Richard Aaron
provides this explanation of critical vendors: “Critical vendor. ‘You don’t pay, I don’t ship. I don’t ship, you
close down.’ A creditor who claims to be essential to the reorganization of the debtor and demands full
payment for pre-bankruptcy debt.” Richard I. Aaron, Hooray for Gibberish!: A Glossary of Bankruptcy Slang
for the Occasional Practitioner or Bewildered Judge, 3 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 141, 151 (2005).
120 Bruce H. White & William L. Medford, The Doctrine of Necessity and Critical Trade Vendors: The
Impracticality of Maintaining Post-Petition Business Relations in Mega-Cases, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept.
2002, at 24.
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Over time, lawyers and judges grew increasingly accustomed to
issuing critical-vendor orders, even when the amounts involved were
quite substantial. Astute suppliers began to lobby the debtor before
the bankruptcy petition to be treated as critical vendors. The debtor’s
managers had little incentive to resist. . . . In the absence of objection,
bankruptcy judges were not likely to push back. Some feared that
they would be labeled ‘toxic judges’ and find themselves out of the
business of hearing large Chapter 11 cases. But for others it was far
simpler. They were inclined to grant motions many support and none
oppose. Over the course of the 1990s, the number and size of criticalvendor payments grew, but little effort was made to ground them in
the Bankruptcy Code.121

As Baird points out, critical-vendor orders proliferated in the 1990’s as more
and more creditors requested them. Many judges were happy to oblige—either
out of fear of losing out on future chapter 11 cases or out of a desire to grant
motions supported by both debtors and their most vocal creditors.
The bankruptcy of retail chain Kmart marked a sea change for critical
vendor orders. Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in this case is the most referenced
appellate court decision on payment of claims of critical vendors.122 In that
case, the bankruptcy judge approved Kmart’s use of about $300 million of its
$2 billion of debtor-in-possession financing to pay in full the prepetition
unsecured claims of 2,330 vendors.123 At the end of the case, the 45,000 other
holders of prepetition unsecured claims were not paid in full nor paid in
cash.124 Instead, they eventually received about 10 cents on the dollar, mostly
in Kmart stock.125
On appeal, the district court reversed the bankruptcy court’s critical vendor
order authorizing the $300 million dollar payment, and the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed.126 In affirming, Judge Easterbrook described the
doctrine of necessity as “just a fancy name for a power to depart from the
Code” and questioned whether there was any statutory support for critical
vendor orders authorizing early payment of prepetition unsecured claims of

121
122
123
124
125
126

Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy From Olympus, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 959, 962–63 (2010).
In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 869.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 869, 874.
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certain vendors.127 Ultimately, Judge Easterbrook decided that the question of
statutory support for critical vendors was one that the court did not need to
decide because the record did not support a finding that Kmart’s immediately
making the $300 million dollar payment to vendors was critical.128
In re Kmart was the last big business bankruptcy case involving substantial
prepetition unsecured vendor claims filed in a bankruptcy court in the Seventh
Circuit. However, Kmart was not the last case in which a bankruptcy court
approved immediate payments in cash for the prepetition unsecured claims of
“critical vendors.”129 Courts in Delaware130 and the Southern District of New

127 Id. at 871. The bankruptcy court used § 105(a) as the basis to confirm the critical vendor order. Id. at
869. Section 105(a) states “[t]he court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.” Id. at 871 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012)). The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals explained that § 105(a) does not provide a court with the authority “to
authorize full payment of any unsecured debt, unless all unsecured creditors in the class are paid in full.” Id.
(internal citations omitted). The court further explained that § 364(b) and § 503 of the Code are not valid bases
for the doctrine either. Section 364(b) allows a debtor to obtain postpetition credit, but “has nothing to say
about how the money will be disbursed or about priorities among creditors.” Id. at 872. Section 503 authorizes
a bankruptcy court to categorize certain payments as administrative expenses, but “[t]reating pre-filing debts as
‘administrative’ claims against the post-filing entity would impair the ability of bankruptcy law to prevent old
debts from sinking a viable firm.” Id. Thus, none of these sections could be the statutory basis for the doctrine
of necessity.
Finally, the court identified § 363(b)(1) of the Code as “more promising.” Id. Section 363 (b)(1) states
that “[t]he trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of
business, property of the estate . . . .” Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1)). The court likened this use of
§ 363(b)(1) to a cramdown in the sense that paying critical vendors will “make even the disfavored creditors
better off.” Id. In order for a cramdown to be accepted, however, the impaired class must do just as well as it
would have done in a chapter 7 liquidation. Thus, two elements had to be satisfied in order to use § 363(b)(1)
in this fashion. First, the debtor in possession must show that the disfavored creditors will be better off, and
second, the debtor in possession must prove that those favored vendors would have ceased deliveries or
services. Neither of these elements was proved in this case. Thus, the court did not need to reach the question
of whether § 363(b)(1) would be a proper statutory foundation for the doctrine of necessity.
128 Id. at 873–74 (“The court did not find that any firm would have ceased doing business with Kmart if
not paid for pre-petition deliveries, and the scant record would not have supported such a finding had one been
made.”)
129 But cf. Anthony Michael Sabino, The Death of Critical Vendor Motions and the Potential Demise of
the Doctrine of Necessity: Farewell to Two Misbegotten Doctrines, 6 TRANSACTIONS TENN. J. BUS. L. 47, 91
(2004) (“[O]ne can forecast Kmart as the new landmark that sweeps away the debris and hubris of decades of
misconceived ‘Doctrines of Necessity’ and its misbegotten offspring of critical vendor relief.”).
130 See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Motor Coach Indus. Int’l v. Motor Coach
Indus. Int’l (In re Motor Coach Indus. Int’l, Inc.), No. 09-078-SLR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10024, at *9 (D.
Del. Feb. 10, 2009) (“[T]he ‘doctrine of necessity’ has not been brought into serious question by courts in the
Third Circuit”); cf. Friedman’s Inc. v. Roth Staffing Cos. (In re Friedman’s Inc.), No. 09-10161 (CSS), 2011
Bankr. LEXIS 4500, at *7–8, *8 n.13 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 30, 2011) (acknowledging the current critical
vendor debate but declining to rule on it because neither party called the critical vendor order into question).
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York131 and, to a lesser extent, middle-America132 have continued to authorize
immediate cash payments to vendors holding prepetition unsecured claims.133
By authorizing such payments, courts are disregarding the cleavage effect of
bankruptcy.
2. Section 503(b)(9)
Prior to 2005, administrative expense priority was reserved for postpetition
debts134—except for the six months rule in railroad reorganization cases.
However, as part of the comprehensive amendments to the Code in 2005,
Congress added § 503(b)(9), further blurring the cleavage effect of filing a
bankruptcy petition. Section 503(b)(9) grants a vendor an administrative
expense priority for the value of any goods received by the debtor within
twenty days before the petition date, as long as the vendor sold the goods to the
debtor in the “ordinary course of [the] debtor’s business.”135
Like the six months rule in railroad reorganization cases, § 503(b)(9) does
not give or create a right to immediate payment. Instead, § 503(b)(9) creates a
priority.136 Administrative expense priorities such as § 503(b)(9) claims must
be paid in full when the chapter 11 plan is confirmed.137
In some chapter 11 cases, courts will not confirm the plan until years after
the petition is filed. In even more chapter 11 cases, courts will not ever confirm
the plan. Instead, the case is converted to chapter 7 or dismissed. And, in many

131 See, e.g., Motion of the Debtors for Entry of Interim and Final Orders Authorizing the Debtors to
Maintain Existing Insurance Coverage and to Pay Obligations with Respect Thereto at 5, 6, In re RHI Entm’t,
Inc. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2010) (No. 10-165365), 2010 WL 6434460; In re Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.,
No. 11-CV-01512-UA, 2011 WL 5546954, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2011).
132 See, e.g., In re O & S Trucking, Inc., No. 12-61003, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 32713271, at *4–5 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. June 29, 2012).
133 But cf. Baird, supra note 121, at 974 (“Many of the critical-vendor payments that flourished before
Kmart were in no sense ‘critical.’ After Kmart, debtors found it easier to push back and call the bluffs of
supposedly critical vendors.”).
134 See Resnick, supra note 85, at 204 (“This new provision is a radical departure from the general rule
that only postpetition expenses are afforded administrative priority.”).
135 11 U.S.C. §503(b)(9) (2012). There has been considerable litigation over the application of
§ 503(b)(9), especially the words in quotes. See generally Paul R. Hage & Patrick R. Mohan, Recent
Developments in Section 503—Administrative Expenses, 2012 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 25 (“In the seven years
since 503(b)(9) became effective . . . courts continue to deal with litigation with respect to nearly every part of
the statutory language . . . .”).
136 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(2), 503(b).
137 Id. §§ 507(a)(2), 1129(a)(9)(A); Resnick, supra note 85, at 204.
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of these cases, the estate is administratively insolvent, i.e., administrative
priority claims are not paid in full.
Understandably, vendors prefer the immediate payment from a critical
vendor order to the administrative priority from § 503(b)(9). And so, just as the
six months rule has not replaced the necessity of payment doctrine, § 503(b)(9)
has not replaced critical vendor orders. Indeed, vendors have referenced
§ 503(b)(9)’s special treatment of vendors as statutory support for critical
vendor orders.138
If the replacement of critical vendor orders is not the reason for Congress’s
addition of § 503(b)(9), what is? The legislative history is not helpful to
understanding Congress’s reasons. There is no meaningful legislative
history.139 That, however, has not stopped law professors and law students
from ascribing policy reasons to Congress. According to Collier, “The
ostensible reason for according administrative priority to such obligations was
to prevent debtors from acquiring goods at a time where the debtor knew that
bankruptcy was imminent and that the debtor would not be able to pay for such
goods.”140
An outstanding student note by Brendan Gage labels Collier’s explanation
for § 503(b)(9) the “stockpiling theory” and points out various flaws with this
theory.141 Gage’s most persuasive argument requires a reference back to the
language of § 503(b)(9): “in the ordinary course of [the] debtor’s business.”142
Gage argues that a debtor’s intentional stockpiling of goods that it anticipates
138 See, e.g., In re News Publ’g Co., 488 B.R. 241, 243 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2013) (“The Motion seeks
authority to pay the pre-petition claims of certain critical vendors . . . pursuant to 11 USC §§ 105(a), 363(b),
364, 503(b)(9) . . . .”); Cho, supra note 100, at 8 (“The section is now increasingly used as an added
justification for granting critical vendor motions.”).
139 See S. Polymer, Inc. v. TI Acquisition, LLC (In re TI Acquisition, LLC), 410 B.R. 742, 746 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 2009) (explaining that no legislative history exists for § 503(b)(9)); In re Plastech Engineered Prods.,
Inc., 397 B.R. 828, 838 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2008) (noting debtor relied on scant legislative history of
§ 503(b)(9)); William J. Lafferty, A Concern in Search of a Policy Why Paying Claims Under Section
503(b)(9) and Allowing Claimants to Use the Same Invoices as ‘New Value’ May Not Be ‘Double Counting’,
WESTLAW J. BANKR., Nov. 12, 2010, at 1, 2 (“The legislative history behind these amendments is sparse . . . .
It is unclear to what extent, if any, Congress gave thought to a myriad of issues that the enactment of Section
503(b)(9) created.”).
140 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 40, at ¶ 503.16; see also Resnick, supra note 85, at 189
(stating apparent congressional intent behind § 503(b)(9) was to curb intentional orders in preparation for
bankruptcy).
141 Brendan M. Gage, Note, Should Congress Repeal Bankruptcy Code Section 503(b)(9)?, 19 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 215, 232–34 (2011) (citing In re Plastech Engineered Prods., Inc., 394 B.R. 147, 151
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2008)).
142 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9); Gage, supra note 141, at 233.
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will help it get through a bankruptcy is not in the ordinary course of the
debtor’s business and so is not even covered by § 503(b)(9).143 Gage discusses
and dismisses other possible policy bases for § 503(b)(9).144 We are inclined to
think that the answer to the question of why did Congress add § 503(b)(9) can
be found in politics, not policy: the lobbying power of vendors.145
The answer to the more important practical question of whether § 503(b)(9)
benefits struggling businesses and their creditors generally or only those 20day vendors depends on whom you represent. In the bankruptcy of Hostess
bakery, one of the company’s suppliers continued to ship goods to the bakery,
even as it knew Hostess was on the verge of bankruptcy.146 According to the
supplier’s manager, § 503(b)(9) keeps businesses operating:
Section 503(b)(9) has encouraged [the supplier] to sell on credit to
potential debtors, knowing that the deliveries made within 20 days
will be protected [by] an administrative claim. . . . As Hostess Brands
edged closer to [its] second filing, [the supplier] was managing our
exposure very closely and continued to extend credit to Hostess
Brands, knowing that we had § 503(b)(9) available to us. At the time
of Hostess Brands’ second filing, [the supplier] was owed $1.6
million, of which $1.2 million was covered by § 503(b)(9). Without
the availability of [a] § 503(b)(9) administrative claim, we would
have withdrawn credit to Hostess Brands.147

From the perspective of the supplier, which benefited from § 503(b)(9)
administrative priority, the provision allowed the supplier to continue shipping
to the debtor, and potentially kept the debtor in business. On the other hand,
creditors who do not benefit from a § 503(b)(9) priority may be wary of
debtors that have significant priority claimants. For example, Circuit City’s
attorneys cited the company’s extensive § 503(b)(9) liability as sounding the
“final death knell” for its attempt at reorganization.148
While there may be uncertainty as to § 503(b)(9)’s policy rationale or its
practical ramifications, it is certain that § 503(b)(9), like critical vendor orders,
143

Gage, supra note 141, at 233 n.94; see also Ponoroff, supra note 22, at 2552 n.146.
Gage, supra note 141, at 228–38.
145 See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 35, at 467 (blaming trade creditor lobbyists for the enactment
§ 503(b)(9)).
146 ABI Commission Field Hearing Focuses on Unsecured Trade Creditor Issues, AM. BANKR. INST. J.,
Aug. 2013, at 8, 8.
147 Id.
148 Circuit City Unplugged: Why Did Chapter 11 Fail to Save 34,000 Jobs?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr.
2009, at 10, 10 (testimony of Richard M. Pachulski, lead counsel to the creditors’ committee of Circuit City).
144
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is a dramatic departure from the concept that the bankruptcy filing results in a
cleavage between prepetition debts and postpetition debts. Section 503(b)(9)
does more than simply move the date of cleavage from the date of the filing of
the bankruptcy petition to twenty days earlier—§ 503(b)(9), like critical vendor
orders, encroaches on established bankruptcy equality concepts. Section
503(b)(9) vendors are treated much more favorably than both (1) other
unsecured creditors who provide value during the twenty days before
bankruptcy and (2) unsecured creditors who provided value more than twenty
days before the bankruptcy filing.
This is not the first law review article to make these criticisms of favoring
the prepetition claims of certain vendors.149 Surprisingly, at least to us, there
have not been similar criticisms of bankruptcy law favoring the prepetition
claims of certain lessors and licensors, which is where we turn next.
V. PREPETITION UNSECURED CLAIMS OF LESSORS
A. Where Are We Now?
Bankruptcy law treats a debtor’s leases, licenses, and other executory
contracts differently from the debtor’s other transactions.150 Section 365 is
3,830 words long151 and uses familiar words in unfamiliar ways.152 Happily,
149

See, e.g., Kara J. Bruce, Rehabilitating Bankruptcy Reform, 13 NEV. L.J. 174, 212 (2012) (“[T]he best
course of action is simply to repeal section 503(b)(9).”).
150 E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2012) (laying out the Code provisions relating to executory contracts and
unexpired leases).
151 Id.
152 In addition to the text of the Code, this area of the law has been particularly influenced by law
professors—a few of the more notable being James MacLachlan, Vern Countryman, and Jay Westbrook. See
David G. Epstein & Lisa Normand, “Real World” and “Academic” Questions About “Nonmonetary
Obligations” Under the 2005 Version of 365(b), 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 617, 617 (2005); David G.
Epstein & Steve H. Nichles, The National Bankruptcy Review Commission’s Section 365 Recommendations
and the “Larger Conceptual Issues”, 102 DICK. L. REV. 679, 682 (1998). A law professor, James Angell
MacLachlan, is generally credited for inventing the bankruptcy law of leases and licenses and other “executory
contracts,” and for drafting § 70b of the Bankruptcy Act, the predecessor of § 365. See generally James Angell
McLaughlin, Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 40 HARV. L. REV. 583 (1927). Leading law professors of their
generations—Vern Countryman and Jay Westbrook—are best known for their articles on § 70b and § 365.
David A. Skeel, Jr., Vern Countryman and the Path of Progressive (and Populist) Bankruptcy Scholarship,
113 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1128 (2000). Professor Vern Countryman’s law review articles based on work he did
for the Commission to Study the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States led to the widely used “Countryman
definition” of executory contracts. See, e.g., Lewis Bros. Bakeries v. Interstate Brands Corp. (In re Interstate
Bakeries Corp.), 690 F.3d 1069, 1073 (8th Cir. 2012), vacated, No. 11-1850, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 12463
(8th Cir. June 18, 2013); Skeel, Jr., supra, at 1076. As stated by Professor Skeel of the University of
Pennsylvania Law School:
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this essay requires a familiarity only with the first part of § 365(b)(1)(A) which
is set out below:
(b)(1) If there has been a default in an executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor, the trustee may not assume such
contract or lease unless, at the time of assumption of such contract or
lease, the trustee—
A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will
promptly cure, such default [and] . . .
C) provides adequate assurance of future performance . . . .153

For our purposes, “assume” simply means continue, keep, or retain. To
illustrate, suppose that Double Dave leases a building and its lease is set to end
eleven months after the time of its chapter 11 filing. Under § 365, Double
Dave can continue to use the leased premises by satisfying § 365(b)’s
requirements for assumption, i.e., cure any default and provide “adequate
assurance of future performance.”154 Similarly, if at the time of Double Dave’s
chapter 11 filing, Double Dave is leasing a pizza oven and the lease ends in
twenty-two months, Double Dave can continue to use the leased equipment
only by satisfying § 365(b)’s requirements for assumption. Or, if Double Dave
is the licensee under a software contract and the license expires in thirty-three
months, Double Dave can continue to use the licensed software only by
satisfying § 365(b)’s requirements for assumption. While other parts of § 365
distinguish leases of personal property from leases of real property and from
licenses, § 365(b) does not. In this essay, we discuss § 365(b)’s requirements
for assumption of an equipment lease. Section 365(b)’s requirements would be
the same for assumption of a building lease.
Again, one of § 365(b)’s requirements for assumption is curing any
prepetition defaults. If Double Dave’s equipment lease provides for monthly
rental payments of $100 and, before filing its chapter 11 petition, Double Dave

If bankruptcy scholars playing a word association game were asked what words came to mind
when they thought of Vern Countryman, nearly every one would respond with the same two
words: executory contracts. In 1973, Countryman wrote an article concluding that a contract
should be viewed as executory (a designation that has enormous consequences in the technical
world of bankruptcy) . . . .
Id. Additionally, law journals have widely cited Professor Jay Westbrook’s article urging the elimination of the
term “executory contract” and a clarification of the consequences of rejection.
153 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1).
154 Id. § 365(b)(1)(A), (C).
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missed three monthly $100 payments, Libby155 would have a $300 prepetition
unsecured claim. Under § 365(b)(1)(A), Double Dave would have to pay that
$300 prepetition unsecured claim in cash in full promptly156 even though
Double Dave’s lenders, service providers, and others holding prepetition
unsecured claims would not be paid until confirmation of Double Dave’s
chapter 11 plan. In most chapter 11 cases, no plan is ever confirmed,157 and
when a plan is confirmed it rarely provides for full cash payments to holders of
unsecured claims. Additionally, under § 365(b)(1)(C), Double Dave would
also be required to continue making postpetition lease payments as they
become due.158 For example, if there were twenty-two monthly payments of
$100 remaining, Double Dave would have to make those payments as each
becomes payable.
That part of § 365(b) makes sense to us. The Code’s requirement of
payment of rent that becomes due after the petition was filed seems consistent
with the cleavage effect of a bankruptcy filing. But why should a lessor’s
unsecured claim for rent that accrued prepetition be treated more favorably
than other prepetition unsecured claims against Double Dave?
This disparate treatment of a prepetition unsecured claim arising from a
lease seems especially problematic when compared with the treatment of a
prepetition unsecured claim arising from a sale of equipment to Double Dave
on credit. Assume that instead of leasing the equipment from Libby, Double
Dave bought the equipment on credit from S, granting S a security interest in
the equipment. The credit sale payments are $150 a month. Double Dave failed
to make the payments for the two months immediately preceding the
bankruptcy filing, and, after filing for bankruptcy, there are ten monthly
payments of $150 that will accrue postpetition. Again, assume that Double
Dave wants to keep the equipment. In this situation, S has a claim for $300 that
accrued prepetition in the Double Dave credit sale hypothetical, the same as
Libby had in the lease hypothetical. And, if as almost always happens in the
real world, the replacement cost of comparable equipment is $1,500 or less,

155

Recall from Part III that Libby is Double Dave’s lessor.
The statute uses the word “cure.” 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(A).
157 Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to the Critics,
107 MICH. L. REV. 603, 615 (2009) (showing confirmation rates of 30.3% in 1994 and 33.4% in 2002 from
empirical studies).
158 The requirement of future performance, as laid out in § 365(b)(1)(C), requires continuing payments of
rent as each payment becomes due. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(C).
156
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that claim for $300 is an unsecured prepetition claim.159 In sum, S has a
secured claim measured by the value of its collateral and an unsecured claim
for the difference between the amount owed and the value of the collateral.
Double Dave’s ability to keep the equipment it is buying on credit from S
depends solely on its ability to satisfy S’s secured claim. To keep the
equipment, Double Dave is not required to pay that $300 unsecured prepetition
claim in full in cash.160 Instead, to satisfy S’s secured claim and keep the
equipment, Double Dave is required only to make payments under its chapter
11 plan to S that have a present value equal to the replacement cost of the
equipment.161 S’s unsecured claim will be treated no differently from any of
the other prepetition unsecured claims against Double Dave, except for Libby’s
unsecured claim for rent that accrued prepetition.
Again, we question why § 365(b)(1)(A) always treats the unsecured
prepetition claim of a lessor, like Libby, differently from other unsecured
prepetition claims?
B. How Did We Get to Where We Are Now?
1. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 did not say anything about leases until the
1938 amendments added § 70b.162 Like § 365(b) of the 1978 Code, § 70b
provided for the possibility of assumption.163 Unlike § 365(b), § 70b does not
say anything about the requirements for assumption nor do any of the few
reported judicial decisions under § 70b.164
More important than what § 70b did not say about the requirements for
assumption is what § 70b did say about the enforceability of provisions in

159 Under the first sentence of § 506 of the Code, the amount of S’s secured claim depends on the value of
S’s collateral. See id. § 506(a)(1). And under the second sentence of § 506(a)(1) and Associates Commercial
Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 953–54 (1997), the value of equipment that the debtor wants to retain is
measured by what it would cost to replace with comparable equipment. Here, if the value of the collateral is
less than $1,500, then the postpetition payments that accrue will exceed the value of the collateral. Thus, the
remaining $300 prepetition claim is unsecured for the amount that it exceeds the value of the collateral.
160 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(A) (“promptly cure . . . such default”).
161 See id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II).
162 Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, Pub. L. No. 696, § 70b, 52 Stat. 840, 880–81 (repealed 1978).
163 Id.
164 Until West started publishing its West’s Bankruptcy Reporter in January 1980, bankruptcy judges’
opinions were not generally available.
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leases that terminated the lease when the lessee filed for bankruptcy. Section
70b expressly made such bankruptcy termination clauses, also known as ipso
facto clauses, enforceable in bankruptcy.165
Such ipso facto clauses were common in commercial leases and, in
essence, left the bankrupt166 with nothing to assume. Accordingly, bankruptcy
court opinions regarding the requirements for assumption not only were not
reported but were virtually non-existent. Responding to the effect of lease
termination as a result of bankruptcy filing, dictum in the Fifth Circuit Court of

165

The words of § 70b are clear: “[A]n express covenant that . . . the bankruptcy of a specified party . . .
shall terminate the lease or give the other party an election to terminate the same shall be enforceable.” Act of
June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, 880–81. The case law, particularly in the Second, Third and Fourth
Circuits became less clear in the 1960’s and 1970’s. All three circuits refused to enforce ipso facto clauses in
bankruptcy. In so ruling, these cases relied on dicta from Supreme Court decisions rather than statutory
language. See, e.g., Queens Boulevard Wine & Liquor Corp. v. Blum, 503 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1974); Weaver v.
Hudson, 459 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1972); In re Fleetwood Motel Corp., 335 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1964). In Finn v.
Meighan, 325 U.S. 300 (1945), the Supreme Court determined that § 70b was applicable to Chapter X
reorganization proceedings, making the bankruptcy termination clause in the lease enforceable. The Court
went further to note that bankruptcy courts are not favorable to forfeiture clauses, which should be construed
liberally to avoid depriving the estate of a valuable asset. While Finn stands for the enforceability of ipso facto
clauses, the Court in dicta also discussed three important equity considerations: (1) the lack of favor shown to
forfeiture provisions, (2) the detriment that enforcement poses to reorganization, and (3) the need to apply
§ 70b so as to be consistent with other provisions in the Act. Id. at 301–02.
A year later the Supreme Court found that § 70b was applicable in railroad reorganizations, but because
§ 77(l) required a determination to be made by the Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”), the
enforceability of the forfeiture clause was not automatic. Smith v. Hoboken R.R., Warehouse & S.S.
Connecting Co., 328 U.S. 123, 131–33 (1945). The ICC was tasked with considering the public interest
affected by the enforcement of the ipso facto clause, as well as the feasibility of the plan. These considerations
imposed by § 77 were such that they could have “prevent[ed] enforcement of the engagements of the debtor
pursuant to their terms.” Id. at 133.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Smith in declining to enforce valid ipso facto provisions was followed
by the circuit courts in In re Fleetwood Motel and Weaver. The court in Fleetwood Motel, mentioning the
inherent equity powers of the court, drew from Smith’s consideration of both public interest and the slim
possibility of a successful reorganization following a forfeiture in declining to enforce an ipso facto clause.
Fleetwood Motel Corp., 335 F.2d at 861–62. Similarly, the Weaver court denied the petitioner’s request to
enforce an ipso facto clause because a “forfeiture would remove the entire res from the estate of the debtor.”
Weaver, 459 F.2d at 744.
In 1974, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals tackled a similar question and relied not only on Finn and
Smith but also on Fleetwood and Weaver. Queens Boulevard Wine & Liquor Corp., 503 F.2d at 205–07. The
majority in Queens Boulevard Wine & Liquor Corp. held that a lease termination provision was invalid in
bankruptcy “when compelling equitable and policy considerations so require.” Id. at 206. There was a strong
dissent in Queens Boulevard; Judge Hays wrote: “[Section 70b] states clearly that a covenant like the one used
here is enforceable. . . . The claim that a liquor store involves the public interest is frivolous. . . . If [70b] does
not apply here, it is hard to imagine a case where it would apply.” Id. at 207 (Hays, J. dissenting).
166 Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, unlike present day bankruptcy law, there were “bankrupts.”
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 1(4), Pub. L. No. 696, 30 Stat. 544, 544 (repealed 1978) (“‘Bankrupt’ shall
include a person . . . who has filed a voluntary petition.”).
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Appeals opinion in Good Hope Refineries, Inc. v. Benavides,167 counseled:
“[A] prudent man who plans to file a Chapter XI petition tomorrow, uses a
cashier’s check to make an important payment today.”168
2. The Bankruptcy Code of 1978
The Brookings Institution established a task force to study bankruptcy laws
in 1965.169 The Brookings report, published in 1971, concluded, “The total
bankruptcy system gets its job done according to the literal requirements of the
law, but it is a dreary, costly, slow and unproductive process.”170 With those
concerns in mind, in 1970, Congress created the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States to study and report on existing law.171
According to Professor Frank Kennedy, the executive director of the
Commission, the Brookings report’s findings and recommendations were
“inputs of value and influence in the preparation of the Commission’s
report.”172
The Brookings report does not address the law of leases, licenses, and other
executory contracts. The Commission’s report does. The Commission filed its
two-part report in 1973. The first part of the report included an evaluation of
the then-present bankruptcy system and general recommendations of
changes.173 The second part of the report included a completely new
bankruptcy law with explanatory notes.174 Section 4-602(b)(2) of the
Commission’s proposed law expressly required past defaults be cured before a
debtor could assume a lease that had a bankruptcy termination clause:
(b) Unenforceability of Certain Contract Provisions. A provision in a
contract or lease . . . which terminates . . . the contract or lease
because of . . . the commencement of a case under this Act . . .

167

602 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 1003.
169 See David T. Stanley, The Brookings Institution Study of Problems of Bankruptcy, 71 COM. L.J. 136,
136 (1966).
170 DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 197 (1971).
171 Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468.
172 Frank R. Kennedy, The Background of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 1979 ANN. SURV. BANKR.
L. 1, 5.
173 COMM’N ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., supra note 24.
174 COMM’N ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS
OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. II (1973), reprinted in 2 BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF
1978: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, DOC. 22 (Alan N. Resnick & Eugene M. Wypyski eds. 1979).
168
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(1) is enforceable in a case under Chapter V [Liquidations],
but
(2) is not enforceable in case under Chapter . . . VII
[Reorganizations] . . . to prevent assumption . . . if, when the
contract or lease is assumed . . . or within a reasonable time
thereafter, any defaults in prior performance of the debtor are
cured . . . .175

Notice that under the Commission’s proposed law, (1) ipso facto clauses were
valid in liquidation cases (modern chapter 7 cases) and invalid in
reorganization cases (modern chapter 11 cases) and (2) the debtor was only
required to cure defaults if the lease, license, or other executory contract
contained an ipso facto clause.
This link between the elimination of ipso facto clauses and imposition of an
obligation to cure defaults was reinforced by the Commission’s note 11 to § 4602. It provides in pertinent part: “Clause 2 of subdivision (b) does impose, in
place of any rights a nonbankrupt party may or may not have under the
contract or lease or under applicable nonbankruptcy law, certain obligations. In
order to assume a contract or lease, past defaults must be cured . . . .”176 Notice
the italicized phrase “in place of.” In effect, the Commission traded payment of
missed prepetition rents in full for invalidation of ipso facto clauses.
The law enacted by Congress in 1978 differs significantly from the law
proposed by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States.
With respect to assumption of leases, licenses and other executory contracts,
(1) the Code invalidates ipso facto clauses in all bankruptcy cases—liquidation
as well as reorganization177—and (2) the Code requires payment in full of
missed prepetition rent even if the assumed lease or contract did not have an
ipso facto clause.178 Nonetheless, Congress’s “explanation” of § 365(b), like
the explanation for § 4-602, links payment of the prepetition claim to
invalidation of ipso facto clauses. The limited, relevant legislative history
states:
The unenforceability of ipso facto or bankruptcy clauses proposed
under this section will require courts to be sensitive to the rights of
the nondebtor party to executory contracts and unexpired leases. If

175
176
177
178

Id. at 152–53.
Id. at 156 (emphasis added).
11 U.S.C. § 365(e) (2012).
Id. § 365(b)(1)(A).
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the trustee is to assume a contract or lease, the courts will have to
insure [sic]179 that the trustee’s performance under the contract or
lease gives the other contracting party the full benefit of his
bargain.180

Again, we can understand the politics of give and take. We just cannot
understand the policy basis for requiring that unsecured claims for prepetition
missed rent must be paid in full. We cannot understand why a lessor must get
the “full benefit of his bargain” when no other holder of a prepetition
unsecured claim gets the full benefit of its bargain.
3. Subsequent Review Commissions
Since 1978, there have been two different organizations—the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission (“Second Commission) and the National
Bankruptcy Conference (“NBC”)—that engaged in comprehensive review of
the Code and published lengthy reports.181 The more frequently cited report is
the 1997 Report of the Second Commission.
In 1994, Congress created the Second Commission as a part of what was
called the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994.182 In 1997, the Second
Commission published a 1,028-page report with more than two hundred
additional pages of individual commissioners’ views.183 The Second
Commission’s only recommendation with respect to assumption of leases and
contracts was that “‘[a]ssumption’ should be replaced with ‘elect to perform’
in Section 365.”184 Congress ignored this recommendation, like virtually all of
the Second Commission’s recommendations.
The NBC began a Code review project in 1988 that culminated in a
published report in 1997.185 While the NBC’s report is significantly shorter
179

The author probably meant “assure.” In re Luce Indus., Inc., 8 B.R. 100, 107 n.7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

1980).
180

H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 348 (1977); S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 59 (1978).
A third organization, the American Bankruptcy Institute (“ABI”), is currently conducting a
comprehensive review of chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. See Press Release, House Judiciary Committee
to Hold Hearing on Chapter 11 Bankruptcy (Mar. 25, 2014), http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/2014/3/
house-judiciary-committee-to-hold-hearing-on-chapter-11-of-the-bankruptcy-code.
182 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (amending Bankruptcy Act of
1978).
183 1 NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 1029–1303 (2007).
184 Id. at 463.
185 The NBC is a non-profit voluntary association of judges, professors, and practicing attorneys from all
parts of the United States. The Conference was founded in the mid-1930’s to promote the improvement of the
181
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than the Second Commission’s report, it provides a much more complete set of
recommendations relating to leases and licenses.
The NBC report recommends “[s]ection 365(b)’s requirements for
assumption of executory contracts should be retained.”186 The NBC provided
two separate justifications for § 365(b)’s requiring payment of a lessor’s
prepetition unsecured claim. The first justification differentiates creditors who
are parties to executory contracts from other unsecured creditors based on the
requirement of future performance under the contract. The second justification
focuses on the normative claim that the estate should not be allowed to take the
benefit of the contract without also assuming the burdens entailed in its
original agreement. As stated by the NBC, the two justifications run together:
A nondebtor party to an executory contract is, with respect to prepetition amounts owed to it, different from other unsecured creditors
of the debtor. The difference is that, under state contract law,
typically the non-debtor party has no duty to continue performing its
obligation under the contract if the debtor falls into default. Thus, to
permit the estate to ‘assume’ the contract without curing existing
defaults would be precisely the equivalent of forcing the non-debtor
(or any other third party) to enter into an entirely new contract to
furnish new value to the estate, on terms to which it does not agree.
The estate should not have such a right to take the benefits of a
contract without its burdens.187

We have three problems with the NBC’s first justification for § 365(b)’s
requiring payment of prepetition defaults: (1) the idea that assumption of an
executory contract provides new value to the estate; (2) the reference to other
third parties; and (3) the idea that debtors would take the benefit of the bargain
without its burdens. First, we disagree with the idea that the nondebtor party to
an executory contract provides “new value . . . on terms to which it does not
agree.”188 The lessor is simply providing the “value” agreed upon in the
prepetition lease, on the terms agreed upon in the prepetition lease. The Code
expressly conditions assumption on “future performance under such contract or

bankruptcy laws and their administration. Since then, the Conference, which meets twice a year, has been
consistently active in the bankruptcy legislative process. See Alan N. Resnick, Symposium Mass Torts:
Bankruptcy as a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening Mass Tort Liability, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2045,
2047 n.8 (2000).
186 NAT’L BANKR. CONFERENCE, REFORMING THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY
CONFERENCE CODE REVIEW PROJECT 137 (rev. ed. 1997).
187 Id.
188 Id.
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lease.”189 Moreover, cases and commentary consistently construe that quoted
phrase as barring the debtor from varying from the agreed upon lease terms.190
The concern identified by the NBC is properly addressed by the Code and its
point is moot.
Second, the NBC’s addition of the phrase “any other third party”191 when
admonishing any rule that would require a nondebtor to furnish new value to
the estate suggests that the Code prohibits all changes to contractual terms.
Prepetition sellers on credit would disagree with any such suggestion. Recall
that Double Dave’s contract with S obligated Double Dave to make ten more
monthly payments of $150 and empowered S to repossess the equipment if
Double Dave did not fulfill that contract obligation.192 In bankruptcy, Double
Dave can retain the equipment without fulfilling its prepetition contract
obligations.193 Moreover, Double Dave can cramdown changes in its contract
payment obligations to credit sellers.194
We are not arguing that Double Dave should be empowered to make
similar changes in its postpetition obligations to lessors, such as Libby.195
Rather, we are simply questioning why lessors’ claims based on prepetition
rent defaults should be treated differently from other prepetition unsecured
claims.
Third, we reject the NBC’s suggestion that, if the Code did not require
debtors such as Double Dave to cure prepetition lease defaults, debtors would
“take the benefits of a contract without its burdens.”196 As noted previously
189

11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(C) (2012).
E.g., In re Smith, 449 B.R. 35, 40 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011) (“[W]hile the Bankruptcy Code permits a . . .
debtor to modify the rights of certain holders of secured claims, since the Movants are parties to an unexpired
lease . . . , the Debtor is not entitled to modify the terms of the Lease . . . .”).
191 NAT’L BANKR. CONFERENCE, supra note 186.
192 See supra Part V.A.
193 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(I).
194 See id. § 1129(b).
195 Professor Ken Klee has made such an argument:
190

[I]t seems unfair to permit the proponent of a plan to rewrite the covenants in a secured debt
instrument to change the payment periods and interest rates for a secured creditor, but not to
permit that to be done for a party with a contractual right under a contract or a true lease.
ALI-ABA WILLIAMSBURG CONFERENCE ON BANKRUPTCY: CONCLUSIONS OF THE PANELS AND TRANSCRIPT OF
PROCEEDINGS 82 (1989). See also Margaret Howard, Equipment Lessors and Secured Parties in Bankruptcy:
An Argument for Coherence, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 253 (1991) (arguing that “analysis of the various
interests of lessors and secured parties demonstrates no differences between them sufficient to justify the
divergent treatment bankruptcy accords.”).
196 NAT’L BANKR. CONFERENCE, supra note 186.
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(and, we acknowledge, repeatedly), the Code conditions a debtor’s assumption
of a lease on “future performance.”197 If Double Dave wants the benefit of
retaining the leased equipment, then Double Dave must continue making the
remaining twenty-two monthly rent payments of $100 each. That is the burden
commensurate with the benefit. Just as we are unpersuaded by the NBC’s first
justification for requiring payment of lessors’ prepetition unsecured claims, we
are also unpersuaded by its second. The NBC’s second justification for
§ 365(b)’s requiring payment of a lessor’s prepetition unsecured claim is
premised on the possibility that the postpetition burden will not always be
commensurate with the postpetition benefit. For its second justification, the
NBC asks, “What if the bulk of the debtor’s performance was to have already
occurred (prepetition) and most of the nondebtor party’s performance is yet to
occur (postpetition)?”198
The NBC is hypothesizing that Double Dave’s lease agreement with Libby
does not provide for equal monthly payments of $100. Instead the lease is
“front-loaded.” An example of a front-loaded lease is a lease requiring four
monthly payments of $2,000 and then twenty-two payments of $30. If Double
Dave files for bankruptcy four months after entering into such a lease, after
missing three of the first four monthly payments of $2,000, then Double
Dave’s postpetition burden would indeed not be commensurate with Double
Dave’s postpetition benefits.
We cannot definitively state how often such front-loaded leases and
contracts are used. However, even without any empirical research, we can
definitely state that such front-loaded leases and contracts are the exception.
And in this situation, the exception does not prove the rule.199
197

See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(C).
NAT’L BANKR. CONFERENCE, supra note 186, at 137–38.
199 See Dana Ziker, What Lies Beneath: An Examination of the Underpinnings of Dietary Supplement
Safety Regulation, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 269, 282 n.102 (2005). According to Ms. Ziker, the common
expression “the exception proves the rule” is actually a misstatement of the original Latin exceptio probat
regulam, which translates to the more logical maxim “the exception probes the rule.” The Latin probare, a root
for both the “prove” and “probe,” means to test or examine. Ms. Ziker relies on Dr. Madsen Pirie who
explains:
198

The origin of the fallacy lies in the changing uses of language. The word “prove,” which is now
taken to refer to establishing something beyond doubt, used to mean “test.” Something would be
“proved” to establish its quality; and this is the sense which has passed down to us in this fallacy.
The exception puts the rule to test and, if it is found to be a valid exception, refutes it instead of
proving it in the modern sense of the word.
Id. (citing MADSEN PIRIE, HOW TO WIN EVERY ARGUMENT: THE USE AND ABUSE OF LOGIC 63 (2006)); cf.
Michael G. Walsh, Lawyerly Clichés and Their Origins (A-G), EXPERIENCE, Spring 2006, at 23, 26; Philip
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Section 365(b)’s requirement that prepetition defaults be cured, like
§ 503(b)(9)’s priority rule regarding twenty-day vendors and like critical
vendor orders,200 is inconsistent with the basic bankruptcy building blocks of
(1) the filing of a bankruptcy petition as effecting a cleavage and (2) the
principle of equality of distribution.
VI. NU?201
We believe that Congress should consider business bankruptcy reform.
More importantly, so do the 150-plus leading bankruptcy professionals202 who
are spending tens of thousands of non-billable hours on the ABI’s Commission
to Study the Reform of Chapter 11.203
When Congress focuses on business bankruptcy, it should consider the
question of whether the prepetition unsecured claims of vendors and lessors
should always be treated more favorably than other prepetition unsecured
claims. Congress should consider this as part of the broader question of

Bobbitt, American Exceptionalism: The Exception Proves the Rule, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 328 (2005) (“As a
statement about proof, the phrase ‘the exception proves the rule is nonsense.’”).
The expression the exception proves the rule, which I confess never made a great deal of sense to
me, means that although something may not conform to the general rule, the rule is still valid.
The term is thought to have originated in the 1500s. Playwright Thomas Heywood used it in The
Rape of Lucrece (1608) when he wrote, “If the general rule have no exceptions, thou wilt have an
empty consistory.”
Walsh, supra. But cf. Christopher C. French, Debunking the Myth that Insurance Coverage Is Not Available or
Allowed for Intentional Torts or Damages, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 65, 67 (2012) (“As Cicero is often quoted as
saying, the exception proves the rule.”).
200 See supra Part IV.
201 For any readers who are culturally challenged the Yiddish term nu (which rhymes with you) is very
hard to define because it has so many meanings. Probably the most common meanings of nu are “and so?” and
“so what?” Michael Wex, Just Say ‘Nu?’: Nu!, JEWISH DAILY FORWARD (Feb. 20, 2008), http://forward.com/
articles/12736/just-say-nu-. But cf. Macmillan Audio, Just Say Nu by Michael Wex—Audiobook Excerpt,
YOUTUBE (Apr. 12, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IphFAg2jYDU.
202 See Chapter 11 Commission Continues Work, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2012, at 10, 10 (listing 138
bankruptcy professionals working on committee reports for the Commission); Michelle M. Harner, ABI
Commission to Study Reform of Chapter 11 Will Meet in April, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2012, at 12, 124
(listing seventeen other bankruptcy professionals working on committee reports for the Commission).
203 The ABI’s Commission was formed in 2012 and issued reports on its findings in 2014. A more cynical
explanation of the Commission’s willingness to spend this time is the continuing decline in the number of
chapter 11 cases and the lack of billable work opportunities. But see Commission Hears Testimony on CROs,
Trustees and Management Retention, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2013, at 10, 91 (quoting Brady C.
Williamson, “I think that [the ABI Commission’s Chapter 11 reform project] may be a very frustrating, if not
futile, endeavor because the fact remains that this Congress and the next Congress and the next Congress are, I
want to be kind, highly unlikely to pass any legislation.”).
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whether fewer bankruptcy issues should be resolved by the application of
statutory mandates and, instead, should be resolved by the exercise of judicial
discretion.204
With all due respect to Congress, the question of whether the prepetition
unsecured claims of vendors and lessors should be treated more favorably than
other prepetition unsecured claims should be left to the discretion of
bankruptcy judges. Permitting bankruptcy judges to deviate from basic
bankruptcy concepts in a particular case because of the special facts of that
case is more defensible than Congress’s creation of blanket rules for all cases
that are inconsistent with basic bankruptcy concepts. Close observers of the
bankruptcy process praise the quality of today’s bankruptcy judges205 and the
selection process that facilitates the selection of highly qualified judges who
are free from bias.206 We are not aware of similar complimentary comments
about today’s Congress or the process by which members of Congress are
selected.
There will probably be people who protest our reform agenda. We are
aware of the critical comments about Congress’s last major bankruptcy
initiative in the 2005 amendments, which is commonly referred to as
BAPCPA. The 2005 amendments focused on consumer bankruptcy law.
Among the more temperate criticisms were the comments of Harvey Miller,
who is generally regarded as the dean of the bankruptcy bar:207
Perhaps the biggest special interest victory is the ill-conceived
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
(“BAPCPA”) . . . . The BAPCPA was enacted after four or more
years of intensive and expensive lobbying by the credit card industry,
204 Cf. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 648, 698 (2010) (“[T]he
standard academic critique of bankruptcy judges is that they exercise too much discretion and are too quick to
depart from the strict letter of the law.”).
205 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 69, 92 (2004)
(“Modern bankruptcy judges have become effective and highly competent professionals.”). But cf. Ted Janger,
Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence and Statutory Design, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 561
(2001).

This distrust of judges is evident in the recent bankruptcy reform efforts and in recent bankruptcy
scholarship of the ‘Law and Economics’ stripe. These legislators and scholars use the supposed
incompetence of bankruptcy judges as a principal basis for arguments in favor of limiting the
goals of bankruptcy law and curbing the discretion of bankruptcy judges.
Id.

206

Rafael I. Pardo, The Utility of Opacity in Judicial Selection, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 633 (2009).
Nelson D. Schwartz & Julie Creswell, Who Knew Bankruptcy Paid So Well?, N.Y. TIMES (May 2,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/02/business/02workout.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
207
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estimated at $50 to $60 million. . . . The BAPCPA fulfilled a longstanding desire on the part of special interest groups to limit the
discretion of the bankruptcy court and thereby reduce the flexibility
of the court to meet the needs of rehabilitation and reorganization of a
debtor.208

We are aware of the body of work of Professor LoPucki alleging that some
bankruptcy judges are under substantial pressure to attract big cases to their
courts, as some judges have changed substantive rules to attract cases.209 Also,
we are aware of the many responses countering Professor LoPucki’s
allegation.210 We acknowledge that there is at least a chance that some
bankruptcy judges will be influenced by a drive to get more big cases.211
In sum, it all comes down to the chance of some212 bankruptcy judges
being influenced by what it takes to get big cases or the certainty of Congress
being influenced by lobbyists. Those who are mindful of Anna Nicole Smith’s
body of work, and not just the work on her body, will remember her immortal
line from the classic motion picture, To the Limit, in which Smith starred as
CIA agent Collette DuBois and said, “I will take that chance.”213

208 Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 in Transition—From Boom to Bust and into the Future, 81 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 375, 388 (2007).
209 See LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE
BANKRUPTCY COURTS 250 (2005).
210 See, e.g., Robert D. Martin, Commentary, Courting Failure? The Effects of Venue Choice on Big
Bankruptcies, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 503–04 (2005) (describing the character of the bankruptcy bench as too high
for incentives to get big cases to sway their decisions).
211 Cf. Lynn M. LoPucki, Response, Where Do You Get off? A Reply to Courting Failure’s Critics, 54
BUFF. L. REV. 511, 514–15 (2006).
212 And how many is some? The overwhelming majority of the 10,000 or so chapter 11 cases filed each
year are small business cases—local restaurants, plumbing subcontractors, and theaters. Most bankruptcy
judges never see any other kind of chapter 11 cases. See Rafeal Efrat, The Tax Burden and the Propensity of
Small-Business Entrepreneurs to File for Bankruptcy, 4 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 175, 177–78 (2008).
213 TO THE LIMIT (Retro Media 1995). Ms. Smith recites the line after being warned about the risks of her
confronting the villain, Arthur Jameson (who looks sort of a like a bald, bearded, and tattooed Governor Rick
Perry—with a better memory, of course). That line can be heard one hour and twenty-eight minutes into the
movie. If you stop after hearing the line and verifying that we did not make this up, then you will miss the
unintentionally poignant last bit of “dialogue” in the film in which Anna Nicole Smith says, “The name is not
DuBois, it is Vickie Lynn.” Id.

